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Intelligence Report

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

South and Southeast Asia

(Reference Title: POLO XXVII)

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TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

South and Southeast Asia

This Intelligence Report presents highlights from a detailed review and analysis of Communist China's foreign policy in South and Southeast Asia published separately as an Annex.

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The series is being produced by the DD/I Special Research Staff; [redacted]
Comments and queries are invited.

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Chief, [redacted] Special Research Staff [redacted]

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TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
South and Southeast Asia

Conclusions

During the ten-year period which ended in the mid-1960's, Communist China's foreign policy in South and Southeast Asia had emphasized conventional diplomacy combined with assurances of friendship and non-aggressive intent. This policy emphasis had been intended to induce the governments of the area either to adopt or to retain neutralist positions and to dissuade them from increasing U.S. influence in the countries.

Beginning in 1966, Mao Tse-tung gradually shifted his foreign policy toward some countries in the area from diplomacy directed at neutralization to the open encouragement of rural-based insurrection. The shift toward stimulation--and where feasible, support--of the several small insurgencies in South and Southeast Asia has been accompanied by a drastic deterioration in the diplomacy of assurance. Never before have the Chinese Communist leaders called for the overthrow of so many neighboring governments, including several with which Peking maintains diplomatic relations. Peking is now openly encouraging "armed struggle" in Burma, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Of the non-Communist nations on China's periphery, only Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan are not present targets of Mao's new insurrectionist line. Cambodia is in a special status between the two extremes, as a small anti-government insurgency is increasingly cutting across the thin fabric of Peking's diplomacy toward Sihanouk.*

*Vietnam and Laos are excluded from this study because they are the primary responsibility of Hanoi and have long been obvious cases of an insurrectionist foreign policy.

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Despite the selective encouragement of insurgency, Peking has continued to be cautious and non-adventurous. With the exception of shallow probes on the border with India, the Chinese have avoided overt and offensive moves on the periphery of the mainland. They have limited their own involvement in the developing insurgencies and have insisted that the guerrillas follow a policy of "self-reliance."

The shift in foreign policy in the area apparently reflects Mao's revived desire to "push" revolutions. Mao seems now to regret that he did not continue without interruption the advocacy and support of rural-based revolution in "the East." His original convictions were reflected in Liu Shao-chi's proclamation in November 1949 that Mao's road of guerrilla war was the model for Communist-led revolution in "colonial and semi-colonial countries" everywhere. In late 1951, he began to soften the revolutionary-insurrectionist line and to shift to conventional diplomacy and the cultivation of neutralism; policy in the ensuing ten-year period was characterized as peaceful coexistence embodying the "spirit of Bandung." Since 1966, however, policy toward certain countries has been moving back toward the earlier revolutionary line.

In addition to his revolutionary compulsion, several basic factors appear to have impelled Mao to adopt this new line in foreign policy. One is Mao's dispute with the Soviet leaders over his contention that rural insurrection is the "only" road to power for Communists and leftists in underdeveloped countries. Another is Mao's increasingly obsessive concern to sustain tension and to intensify "class warfare" in foreign policy as well as in internal affairs. Another factor is Peking's increased support of Hanoi, and the desire to punish those governments which aid the U.S. or refuse to adopt the Communist position on the Vietnam war. Still another factor --one which operated during a period of highly irrational behavior from January to early September 1967--seems to have evolved from Mao's desire to export his ego-cult. During that wild eight-month period, Chinese Communist diplomats abroad adopted extremely militant practices; in Peking, a number of foreign embassies were invaded

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and several offices were severely damaged. In order to retain formal diplomatic relations with some countries and to prevent a large-scale exodus of foreign diplomatic missions from Peking, Mao apparently permitted Chou En-lai to preside over a retreat from the 1967 irrationalities.

This has been a partial retreat, however. It has not been accompanied by a corresponding retreat from the insurrectionist line imposed on certain unfriendly countries. On the contrary, that line has been sustained toward every country against which it had been declared. The return to an insurrectionist line is a new feature of Mao's foreign policy in South and Southeast Asia and will probably continue for sometime.

Mao's second-in-command, Lin Piao, the capable guerrilla warfare strategist who has "safeguarded" Mao's views against Chinese military professionals, probably will sustain Peking's new foreign policy line, and, if he succeeds Mao, continue that line.

Although Peking's new insurrectionist line is centered on nibbling tactics and takes a long view, overall Chinese policy in South and Southeast Asia during the next several years will probably be increasingly bellicose.

Peking's effort to stimulate guerrilla warfare is concentrated on Burma and Thailand. The threat in these countries is long-term, but nonetheless important. In Burma, Mao and his lieutenants apparently intend gradually to expand the small insurgent forces of the Kachin and Shan tribes along the China border, and to build up the small and weak political-military apparatus of the Burmese Communists (White Flags) in central-south Burma. At the same time, they will try to create from these elements and others an integrated insurgent movement led by the Communists. Although some conditions in Burma are favorable for support of the insurgency, the development and maintenance of unified insurgent forces among disparate political and ethnic groups has always been a major problem.

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In Thailand, Peking is encouraging insurgent movements now in being in at least three areas, and this effort seems to be parallel to one which Hanoi is implementing in that country.

The rate of expansion of these small insurgent movements probably will be slow, but the Chinese have indicated that the "protracted" nature of the struggle is useful for the building of an effective party apparatus and guerrilla force. Mao seems to believe that insurgent movements in the area will distract the U.S. and, as stated in a July 1967 Peking broadcast, provide a more favorable situation for the Vietnamese "people's war," as well as demonstrate the correctness of his strategy of rural-based insurrection.

Introduction

Communist China was successful in keeping on good terms with most neutral leaders in nearby countries after 1954, reassuring them, especially the Indonesians and Burmese, that Peking would not use local assets for subversion. That general mollifying policy is now mainly discarded toward most neutrals in the area. The record shows that, roughly speaking, diplomacy (and its restraints) were dominant in Peking's foreign policy from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. During that period, Mao accepted the rational principle that, in order to prevent U.S. "encirclement" of the mainland, armed insurrection in the area must be subordinated to a policy of assurance-against-subversion. That is, he had been convinced that, as an antidote to containment, diplomacy could be more useful than revolution.

As a consequence, Peking adopted the kind of diplomatically "correct" policies usually associated with Chou En-lai, observing the nationalistic sensitivities of neutral leaders and accepting the legitimacy of their governments, and encouraging neutralism wherever possible. However, Mao and Chou did not view the governments as one homogenous or undifferentiated group of neutrals,

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and Peking clearly indicated a preference for the policies of those countries which were vigorously involved in anti-Americanism--viz., Cambodia and Indonesia.

I. The Neutrals

Cambodia: Although Chou had been tactful in moving Sihanouk away from the West by exploiting his fear and hatred of countries friendly to the U.S., such as Thailand and South Vietnam, he had in 1960 warned that Peking would make problems for Phnom Penh if Cambodia "permitted the entry of American troops" on its territory. Increasingly thereafter, Sino-Cambodian relations centered on the basic matter of whether Sihanouk was to be given a clear statement of commitment by Peking regarding Chinese Communist military intervention to defend his regime from outside attack. Chou's practice was to string him along with statements which implied such a commitment, but never explicitly declared it. At no great cost beyond some political support and military aid, the Chinese leaders induced Sihanouk to be their most faithful sycophant among non-Communist national leaders, and increasingly the Cambodian chief of state defended a whole range of Mao's policies, including vituperative anti-Americanism and vigorous support of the Communist position on the Vietnam war. When, following his October 1965 talks with the Chinese leaders (who advised him to reject Soviet aid), Sihanouk acted independently to sign a military aid agreement with Moscow (18 March 1966), Peking became less effusive in praising him. The Chinese leaders, however, continued to encourage his assertive anti-Americanism and retained that part of their policy which was intended to deter him from re-establishing diplomatic relations with Washington and reducing his hostility to Saigon and Bangkok.

This rational policy was temporarily discarded during the aberrant period of Mao's proxy "revolutionization" of Foreign Ministry officials in the spring and summer of 1967. In that wild period, Sihanouk's nationalistic sensitivities were outraged by Chinese diplomats

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disseminating Mao's ego-cult in Cambodia and by Peking's interference with his action against a pro-Chinese friendship association. When, in late October 1967, Chou was permitted to revive his policy of assurance-against-subversion, he attained a reciprocal pledge from Sihanouk regarding a toning down of anti-Peking criticism in Phnom Penh. Chou may not be able to keep Mao convinced that, so long as Sihanouk is demonstrably anti-American and supports the Communist position on the Vietnam war, he should be kept in tow. At present, a small anti-government insurgency in Cambodia is starting to cut directly across Peking's diplomacy and may eventually impell Sihanouk to withdraw his ambassador.

Indonesia: Clear signs in mid-1960 that Sukarno was prepared to work with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) under Nasakom (national-religious-Communist) unity, and that he could replace Nehru as Communist China's major political partner in the area, induced the Chinese leaders to cultivate his good will. Mao and his wife personally participated in September 1962 in the effort to move Djakarta into Peking's camp regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute, and in January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio was urged by the Chinese leaders to accept their position in that dispute. Sukarno's assertive anti-Americanism became a key unifying factor, and his "To hell with your [U.S.] aid" speech of 25 March 1964 induced the Chinese leaders to support his policy of "confrontation" with Malaysia and the UK. The Chinese kept their military support at the no-risk level, promising some weapons and guerrilla-war instructors; they were more forthcoming with economic aid.

They used this increased leverage on Sukarno in January 1965 to try to attain greater PKI representation in the Cabinet, their intention being to advance Aidit's strategy of working within Indonesia's "bourgeois-nationalist" government as well as outside it to help bring the PKI to power.

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Failure of the Sukarno-Audit coup (1 October 1965) converted a major anti-American partner into a pro-West enemy at a time when Peking's diplomacy had suffered setbacks elsewhere. In order to avoid a new setback and to

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retain an official presence in Djakarta, Peking did not immediately shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy. Because Mao had not yet called for a "revolutionization" of the Foreign Ministry, Chou had some leeway to try to avoid a diplomatic break despite vigorous persecution of Overseas Chinese. After Mao called for "revolutionization" of Chinese embassy officers (9 September 1966), Peking's exchange of vituperation with Djakarta escalated into serious diplomatic insults, including a calculated snub of Suharto by the Chinese military attache, who was expelled as a result (31 January 1967). Diplomacy deteriorated rapidly during the fanatical period in the spring and summer of 1967; each nation invaded the embassy of the other on 5 August (the Chinese acted in retaliation), but by that time the Chinese already had shifted to Mao's revolutionary-insurrectionist policy and had appealed to Indonesians "to overthrow the reactionary regime" (PRC government statement of 26 April 1967) and "to overthrow the Suharto-Nasution fascist regime" (Red Flag editorial of 9 July 1967). Concealing their own earlier encouragement of the PKI to work within Sukarno's government, the Chinese leaders began to insist that the PKI should have begun "armed struggle" in the Maoist pattern at an earlier stage of the revolution.

Suspension of diplomatic relations by Djakarta on 10 October 1967 has deprived Peking of an easy channel for supporting the PKI, but the new PKI politburo is now pledged to a Maoist program of long-term party building and, later, guerrilla warfare. Peking's open support for this program and its use of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia to disseminate anti-Djakarta propaganda, as well as the policy orientation of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, reduce the prospect for re-establishing diplomatic relations between Peking and Djakarta in the near future and isolates the Chinese leaders from a former major ally.

Burma: The Chinese leaders apparently believed that Chou En-lai's assurance-against-subversion made to Rangoon in June 1954 would induce Burma to keep the American presence at a minimum and to avoid participation in any anti-Communist regional alliance. Although the Chinese Communists had engaged in various forms of subversive

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activities--including contacts with Burmese Communists--they had limited the scope of covert operations sufficiently to avoid a major dispute. Even when their policy toward Rangoon had included the sending of PLA patrols into the Kachin State in mid-1956 to exert pressure during a border dispute or again in November 1960 to support Burmese army action against Chinese Nationalist irregulars, revolution had been subordinated to diplomacy. The Chinese Communists did not supplant Burmese authority or establish Communist rural bases in the border areas as they could have done.

Mao's diplomacy became increasingly crude, however, following Peking's June 1964 decision to increase support for Hanoi. Seeking to win acceptance of Peking's position on the Vietnam war, Ne Win was hectored and harassed by Chou and Chen Yi in July 1964, by Chou during three visits in April 1965, and by Chou again in Peking in July 1965. Ne Win resisted these pressures, which had the effect of disillusioning him with Peking. He had not taken kindly to Chinese support for 20 White Flag Communists who had come from Peking in October 1963 to negotiate--unsuccessfully--terms for an end to insurgency, and he was angered by subsequent revolutionary initiatives which indicated more open Chinese support for the White Flags in Burma. The list of initiatives includes: Peking Radio's broadcast of a Communist Party of Burma (CPB) message (30 September 1964) implying the need for a new 25X1 government; Chen Yi's request in early December 1964 that Ne Win try again to include the White Flags in a 'united front' government;

These moves provoked Ne Win. He reacted with increasing irritability and with firmer anti Peking moves against signs of more aggressive Chinese Communist intentions.

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It was in this atmosphere of increasing Sino-Burmese tensions that "revolutionized" Chinese diplomats returned to Burma in January 1967 to disseminate the symbols of Mao's cult among Burmese and local Chinese. This was the immediate cause of the open exchange of recriminations between Rangoon and Peking.

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Chinese sentiment culminated in the murder of a Chinese embassy technician by a Burmese demonstrator on 28 June. Peking's response was to subordinate diplomacy even more to revolution by depicting the government for the first time as "reactionary" (NCNA report of 28 June), praising "the revolutionary armed struggle led by the CPB" (People's Daily editorial of 30 June), broadcasting the 28 June CPB demand for the "complete overthrow" of Ne Win (broadcast of 1 July), and ordering its technicians to stop work (PRC government note of 5 July). On 31 October, when Peking was impelled to withdraw all its aid personnel from Burma, the Chinese warned that they would continue to support "the Burmese people's revolutionary struggle;" however, this was merely a publicly stated euphemism for their earlier shift to Mao's revolutionary-insurrectionist policy, in the summer of 1967.

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Sino-Burmese relations have not been formally broken, but Ne Win may be impelled to do just that as the Chinese become more active in trying to make the border area insurgency a major problem for his security forces.

Nepal: Nepal's leaders have been encouraged to remain neutral not only to prevent them from joining an anti-Communist regional alliance, but more importantly, to detach Nepal from India's dominant influence. After Sino-Indian border clashes intensified, following the Tibet revolt in March 1959, the Chinese leaders decided to make their charges of Indian "expansionism" appear more credible by treating Nepal as a completely independent country, in contrast to New Delhi's depreciatory paternalism. The Chinese placed an ambassador in Kathmandu for the first time in August 1960, split the difference on ownership of Mount Everest by drawing the border-agreement line through its summit in October 1961, accused India of "great-nation chauvinism" toward Nepal in May 1962, gained the right to bring aid equipment into Nepal "from the north" in January 1963, and expanded their presence through additional aid agreements in September 1965 and December 1966. By May 1967, they were effectively competing with India and had displaced part of the latter's dominant influence.

But "revolutionized" Chinese officials, who had returned from re indoctrination sessions in Peking, abused Nepalese nationalistic sensitivities by disseminating Mao badges and books along the Kathmandu-Kodari road and by claiming in an NCNA account of the road-opening ceremony on 26 May 1967 that "many" Nepalese shouted that Mao is the sun shining in the hearts of all peoples. The "revolutionized" Chinese also used the new road to import from

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Tibet large shipments of propaganda materials through the Nepalese postal system. The Nepalese leaders were further angered by the undiplomatic demonstrations for Chinese diplomats, expelled from New Delhi, conducted at the Kathmandu airport by Chinese embassy officials in late June. Anti-Chinese students were aroused to a violent demonstration of their own against the Chinese for displaying only Mao's picture in Peking's stall during the annual celebration of the King's birthday on 1 July.

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[redacted] on 8 July, Peking publicly charged the Nepalese government, for the first time, with complicity

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[redacted] because they believed that the Chinese leaders had been tactfully working to downplay the 1 July incidents. In contrast to the unprovocative action of the Chinese ambassador, another fanatical accusation was broadcast by Peking Radio on 21 July, thundering a series of demands and insisting that Kathmandu "must promptly annul all measures discriminating against China and stop all anti-Chinese utterances and deeds on Nepalese territory." (emphasis supplied) This was the style of "red diplomatic fighters" and not that of Chou En-lai, but Chou apparently had to swim with this current.

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Although tensions have subsided, the Nepalese leaders are more suspicious of the Chinese leaders than they have been in recent years. Kathmandu has established a committee in its Foreign Ministry to evaluate security reports on the activities of Chinese, as well as Soviet, officials in Nepal. In order to prevent New Delhi from reasserting its influence more extensively, the Chinese will have to mollify Kathmandu in any future disputes provoked by Mao's "revolutionized" diplomats.

Afghanistan: Afghanistan's unobtrusive neutralism and inactive role in major international developments have kept it on the periphery of Peking's foreign policy efforts. Intensification of Peking's disputes with New Delhi and Moscow, however, impelled the Chinese leaders to try to enlist the Afghans in their camp. A friendship and non-aggression treaty was signed in 1960, a border agreement was added in November 1963, and economic aid and cultural exchange agreements followed in March 1965. Despite Kabul's rebuff of the Chinese delegation's effort in April 1966 to induce Afghan officials to condemn the U.S. policy in Vietnam, the unobtrusive Afghans have not stirred any deep resentments in Peking and relations seem to have been unaffected by Peking's general shift to the left in foreign policy.

Ceylon: The neutral policy of Ceylon kept relations friendly until the Tibet revolt in 1959 and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962 combined to create some degree of antipathy when Colombo refused to take a strong pro-Peking stand. Relations were exacerbated to an unprecedented degree during the fanatical period in the spring and summer of 1967. After a Ceylon Communist party politburo member publicly touted Mao to Red Guards in Peking as "the greatest teacher, leader, and Marxist-Leninist alive" (speech of 26 May 1967) and after Mao rewarded this kind of sycophancy by having an "extremely cordial conversation" with him on 6 June, Ceylon's Foreign Minister protested to the Chinese charge (interview of 11 August) about Peking's support for a man who advocated

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"overthrow" of the government. The charge replied in the most revolutionary way he could--namely, by quoting from Mao's "thought". He was ordered out of the Foreign Minister's office.

But the immediate cause of open Sino-Ceylonese recriminations was the 15 August Peking protest over Colombo's seizure of goods and a parcel of Mao buttons addressed to the Chinese embassy. By publicizing their protest, the "revolutionized" Chinese impelled the Ceylonese, who had preferred to keep the dispute in private channels, to release their reply to the press. The Chinese escalated the dispute, organized a demonstration in front of Ceylon's embassy in Peking on 20 August

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Chou may have been permitted, at this point, to reduce the tensions, and although demonstrations were again staged in front of the embassy in early September, they were carefully controlled and of limited intensity and duration.

The Chinese leaders now seem to be reluctant to warm Indian hearts by protracting the dispute with Colombo. But if a renewed effort to spread the Mao-cult should provoke Colombo into a new round of protests, the Chinese, operating under Mao's revolutionary policy, probably would respond with open vituperation.

Pakistan: The Chinese leaders view Pakistan as a counterweight to India in South Asia. Since the establishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in May 1951, they have avoided antagonizing Karachi on the Kashmir issue. Unlike the Soviets, who supported Indian claims, they refused to recognize New Delhi's sovereignty over the area. In the process of trying to isolate New Delhi internationally, the Chinese leaders increased ties with the Pakistanis, concluding a border agreement in March 1963, an airline agreement in August 1963, and apparently some arrangements for supplying military aid in February 1964 during Chou En-lai's visit. By that time, Ayub had become Mao's quasi-ally and was to receive important political support during the India-Pakistan war in September 1965. The Chinese leaders, for the first time since the

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establishment of the Peking regime, committed the PLA to some form of action within a specified time limit in support of a non-Communist quasi-ally. Their ultimatum of 16 September 1965 to New Delhi demanding that structures on the Sikkim-Tibet border must be dismantled within three days was intended to humiliate the Indians and to ease pressure on hard-hit Pakistani forces. The unprecedented commitment was, they apparently calculated, safe in military terms; they could control the extent and nature of any skirmishes with Indian border patrols, correctly discounting the prospect of a major Indian attack. Politically, however, they had taken a major risk.

They could not control Ayub's policy, and when he moved to end the fighting on 18 September, Mao's diplomats were out on a political limb and were impelled to explain why they had not acted on their ultimatum. International opinion, which was extremely critical of Mao's war-like interference and favorable to Moscow's moderating effort, confronted Peking with a major foreign policy setback. This rash political commitment apparently reflected Mao's increasing reluctance, in recent years, to act on the basis of what his foreign policy experts--Chou, particularly--tell him about the probable detrimental consequences of revolutionary moves. In any case, the Chinese leaders tried to absorb the political defeat and to retain Ayub as a useful counterbalance to India, their major enemy in South Asia.

The Pakistanis have been accorded special treatment and have been exempted from psychological and physical attacks in the course of Mao's purge on the mainland. Communist China's military aid program for Pakistan continues. In late September 1967, the Chinese diplomatic mission leaving Tunisia turned over Peking's interests there to the Pakistani embassy. The Chinese leaders are aware that Ayub will insist on sustaining high-level contacts with Soviet and American officials. Despite signs of Sino-Pakistani frictions in 1967, Peking probably will continue to support Ayub and to avoid imposing a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy against his government so long as he remains an enemy of India and does not criticize Peking's policies.

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India: Once Communist China's major friend in the area, India is now a major enemy. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in April 1950, Chou En-lai had been given considerable leeway to try to maintain friendly relations between Peking and New Delhi. Implementing a policy of assurance-against-subversion, he set forth the five principles of peaceful coexistence with Nehru in April 1954 and even stated that Sino-Indian relations were graced with a special personal relationship between himself and the Indian prime minister.

India's transformation in 1959 from friend to enemy was a development which the Chinese leaders accepted with reluctance. Because of India's importance in South Asia, Chou in April 1960 tried to induce Nehru to negotiate the border dispute. But Nehru rebuffed him, and, as the Indians began to occupy positions near and in some cases behind Chinese border posts (after the PLA had moved into Indian territory earlier in the western sector), the Sino-Indian border dispute gradually developed into a major clash.

Shortly after their first attack on Indian positions in October 1962, the Chinese appraised Nehru as a man who had put himself in the position of a lackey of the imperialists" (People's Daily article of 27 October 1962). Mao in September 1964 professed a desire to settle the border dispute by negotiations, but his policy toward New Delhi actually was to discard more and more openly any possibility of negotiated settlement. As the Pakistan-India war developed, Chou tried to clear his own name by dissociating himself from the earlier policy, attacking "the Indian reactionaries' vaunted nonsense about their policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence" (speech of 9 September 1965). A full scale clash was averted, but the Chinese made a series of temporary shallow probes into Indian territory, partly to assert their own claims and partly to encourage the Pakistanis to sustain (or revive) their military confrontation with Indian forces.

This active patrolling policy subsided in 1966 but was resumed in August 1967, following an intensification

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of Peking-New Delhi recriminations over Chinese open support for a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy for Indian Communists and after Indian diplomats had been beaten by Red Guards. Firefights on 11 September and 1 October 1967 apparently were military expressions of intensified political relations.

Peking's support for the revolutionary-insurrectionist road in India was declared openly in the spring of 1967. "Rebellion" is "the only way out" for the Indian people, according to the People's Daily of 19 May 1967. The tribal minorities in the northeast--i.e., the Nagas and Mizos--were praised for waging "armed struggle."

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The Chinese centered their attention on Communist insurgents in India in late June 1967, praising the small group of extremists in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal as "the revolutionaries" of the Indian Communist Party, and on 5 July, People's Daily made it clear that only the China model--viz., "Mao Tse-tung's road" of "using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities"--would be acceptable to Peking. This political support for a ludicrously small group occurred in the context of Peking's criticism of both the right and the left wings of the CPI, indicating that the Chinese will insist on complete rather than partial support from any Indian Communists in the future.

The Sino-Indian diplomatic dispute, which had intensified Peking's appeals for a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy, developed in early June 1967 at a time when Mao was permitting (if not encouraging) Red Guards to defy the practice of diplomatic immunity. The beatings administered to the Indian embassy's second secretary when he was expelled on 14 June led to a retaliatory attack on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the 16th and a siege of the Indian embassy in Peking on the 17th, and there seemed to be little more that could be done to strain Sino-Indian relations further.

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The prospect seems to be for all-out political warfare despite the existence of diplomatic relations. Small and sporadic patrol clashes almost certainly will occur on the border. Peking will continue to exaggerate the importance of any future Maoist-type uprisings, and probably will continue to provide some aid to the Nagas and Mizos.

II. The Non-Neutrals

Regarding enemies such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, the Chinese leaders' shift to a revolutionary-insurrectionist policy required only a further subordination of diplomacy to revolution because government-to-government relations had not been established.

Thailand: Failure to move the Thais away from their close relationship with the U.S. impelled the Chinese leaders to drop their relative restraint. At some time between the central committee work conference of June 1964 and the U.S. airstrike against North Vietnam in August 1964, the Chinese leaders apparently decided to create trouble for Bangkok by organizing anti-government Thais into a united front of political and military opponents.

The political prong of this dual effort was centered on establishing seemingly non-Communist fronts--viz., the Independence Movement of Thailand and the Thai Patriotic Front--in November 1964 and January 1965, respectively.

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On 6 October 1965, Mao himself participated in the effort to exploit the former prime minister Pridi, who has been in exile in China for many years, but Pridi apparently refused to lend his name to either of the front groups.

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The military prong of the Chinese effort was to be encouragement and support of the insurgency. NCNA rebroadcast a Thai Communist appeal for the "overthrow" of the Bangkok government in December 1964

the small Communist insurgency in northeastern Thailand seemed to be improving its organization; by May, Peking broadcasts of Thai language intensified; by July, the People's Daily attacked Bangkok's support of the U.S.;

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The North Vietnamese are also participating in the paramilitary effort

The prospect appears to be for greater Chinese encouragement of the various Thai and minority insurgent groups while insisting that the guerrillas follow a policy of "self-reliance."

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Malaysia and Singapore: The Chinese leaders openly declared their support for the small insurgent group of Communists operating against the Malaysian government authorities from almost inaccessible bases in southern Thailand. On 15 April 1965, the CCP sent a message of greetings to the Communist Party of Malaya, pledging support against the "Rahman clique," and on 12 January 1966, they publicized the establishment "in China" of a mission of the CPM front organization, the Malayan National Liberation League, whose leader in Peking insisted that "People's revolutionary war is the only answer to counter-revolutionary war." The leader of this Peking-based organization tied the small Malayan insurgency to Vietnam, declaring on 1 February 1966 that the anti-Malaysia campaign would be intensified "to coalesce with the anti-imperialist struggle in Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

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The prospect is for sustained Chinese encouragement of these Communist insurrectionists in southern Thailand (along the border with peninsular Malaysia) and of the ethnic Chinese guerrillas in Sarawak. They will continue to depict the new state of Singapore as an additional target for subversion and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew as a "puppet" of the West who should be overthrown, but their first effort will be directed at penetrating political parties rather than inciting overt insurrection in the immediate future.

The Philippines: Peking's ten years of people's diplomacy toward the Philippines has failed to move Manila out of its close relationship with the U.S. In early 1966, when the Chinese began to revolutionize their policy toward Manila, their primary goal was to warn government leaders to avoid direct support of the American effort in Vietnam. In mid-February 1966, Peking Radio's Philippines section sharply increased its broadcasts to the islands and in mid-March 1966, the Chinese called for a "struggle against American efforts to induce...the Philippines to send troops to South Vietnam."

In contrast to the earlier policy of professing non-support for the Communists in the islands, Peking published the "Philippine Communist Party's" 1 May 1967 program of armed struggle against the government. However, the Chinese seem to be exaggerating the size of the pro-Peking elements among the Philippine Communists, the degree of control which these elements have over the insurgents, and the extent of the insurgency. They claim that, as a general principle, Communist-led revolution can succeed even in isolated islands.

The prospect seems to be for the Chinese to try to establish a small group of Communists and leftists as a distinctly separate organization from pro-Soviet elements. They will almost certainly continue to insist that rural insurrection is the only way to seize power in the islands.

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Hong Kong and Macao: Although Mao in 1959 had complained about foreign control of Hong Kong and Macao, for many years thereafter he had been unwilling to use the PLA to seize the colonies or to begin a political-subversive struggle to impose local Communist control on their governments. Khrushchev's derisive remarks about the colonies in December 1962 did not impel him to change his policy of avoiding a confrontation.

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Only after Mao's foreign policy was "revolutionized" in the wake of the purge on the mainland was he willing to change the line of caution and restraint.

Local leftists in Macao influenced by the militant political atmosphere on the mainland, engaged in activity which led the Portuguese authorities to suppress them in November 1966. The Chinese leaders exploited this incident (34 Chinese were injured) to attain an easy foreign policy victory, in which "revolutionaries" subjugated "imperialists," and by mid-December 1966 a combination of local demonstrations and threats from the mainland resulted in a protocol which formalized a significant loss of Portuguese authority in the colony. In effect, the Chinese leaders are now the proxy rulers of Macao.

The Chinese leaders and the Hong Kong leftists (mostly union leaders and students) were encouraged to act in a revolutionary way toward the British authorities. On 6 May 1967, colony riot-police clashed with local Chinese, who were demonstrating and shouting Maoist slogans outside a Kowloon factory. Twenty-one workers were arrested. This incident sparked a major confrontation between Peking and London. Unlike the Portuguese, the British courageously resisted the combined pressures of local leftists and Peking's threats--which included the burning of the British chargé's office in the Peking embassy on 22 August--and refused to accept various humiliating demands. The Chinese leaders finally backed down, ordered their apparatus in Hong Kong to end the violent phase, and accepted a temporary defeat--that is, they allowed the situation to subside into a low-boil protracted political confrontation.

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The prospect seems to be for no improvement of Sino-British relations until London accepts certain demands regarding arrested Chinese in Hong Kong. The Chinese leaders may intensify the struggle to counter specific British actions against the colony's leftists or to comply with any future intensification of Mao's purge on the mainland.

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